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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH FARM BUREAU MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ORVIL ANDREWS & SONS, 
d/b/a NEBO BLACK ANGUS 
RANCH, ORVIL ANDREWS, 
and NELDON ANDREWS, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) ) 
) ) ) 
) 
) 
) ) ) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~> 
Case No. 18239 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
I. STATEMENT OF CASE 
The statement of Appellant is accurate. 
II. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The statement of Appellant is basically accurate, 
however, it fails to set forth the totality of relevant 
procedural occurrances and issues decided in the lower court. 
Procedurally, in addition to granting Defendants'/ 
Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment, the lower court 
specifically rejected and denied a Motion for Summary Judgment 
asserted by Plaintiff/Appellant on the same issues as presented 
in Respondents' motion. 
With respect to omitted issues, the lower court in 
it's written decision rendered on or about October 26, 1981, 
-1-
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held, that, in addition to not being an "automobile" as that 
term is defined by the subject insurance policy, the vehicle 
owned and operated by Respondents was and remains a "farm 
implement not subject to Utah motor vehicle registration and 
design[ed] for use principally off public roads." (R. 135) 
III. RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The statement.of Appellant is accurate. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement.of Appellant is basically accurate, 
however, several relevant and arguably controlling facts have 
been omitted. 
As alleged by Appellant, Respondents own and operate a 
2800 acre cattle farm in Juab County, State of Utah (R. 132). 
In connection with the operation of said farm, Respondents 
purchased and had constructed a "feeder unit", consisting of a 
"Gehl" animal feeder box assembly mounted on a "Ford" truck 
chassis (R. 46, 59, 67-102, 132). Said feeder unit was 
designed solely for the purpose of spreading feed in 
Respondent's fields and is not fit nor suitable for other 
purpose (R. 48, 49, 67-102, 135). Said unit, as acknowledged 
by Appellant, was used by Respondents for this purpose and, in 
fact, was used exclusively therefor (R. 60, 132, 135, 
Deposition of Orvil Andrews, pp. 4, 7, 14, and Deposition of 
Neldon Andrews, pp. 13, 14, 16, 17, 25, and 28 )-. · 
Indeed, at the time of the subject accident the feeder 
unit was being utilized by Respondents in connection with said 
-2-
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feeding operations (R. 60, 133, 136). Admittedly, the unit was 
.. 
located on a public highway at the point of collision, but it 
was only there momentarily on its way to another feeding area 
maintained by Respondents. 
The operation of said unit on the public road was only 
incidental to its intended use and was, by no means, necessary 
to its operation nor its ability to perform that function for 
which it was designed. Similarly, the only time said unit was 
located on public roads was in connection with its transmission 
between certain fields maintained by Respondents (R. 136). It 
was neither economical nor practical to use it on such roads 
for any other purpose (Deposition of Neldon Andrews, p. 25). 
As alleged by Appellant, Respondents believed and at 
all times considered the subject feeder unit to be personal 
property "just like other farm machinery", and indeed, were 
confirmed in that belief by Juab County, which, for tax 
purposes, assessed it as a non-licensed vehicle (R. 107). At 
all times the subject unit was, without objection, listed on 
Respondent's affidavits to said taxing authority as an item of 
personal property (R. 107). 
Respondents take exception to the description offered 
by Appellants with regard to the precise manner in which the 
subject accident occurred. The particulars thereof are not as 
yet known, are not relevant hereto and do not aid the court in 
resolving the issues germane to this appeal. 
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Finally, the subject insurance policy was, in all 
0 
respects, drafted, prepared and constructed by Appellant. With 
the exception of executing the same, Responden~s were in no way 
involved in the drafting, preparation or selection of its 
terms, conditions or language. 
V. ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT 
THE SUBJECT FEEDER UNIT WAS NOT AN "AUTOMOBILE" 
UNDER APPELLANT'S FARM LIABILITY POLICY. 
A. Introduction 
It is undisputed that, on or about February 6, 1980, 
the date of the accident giving rise to the instant action, 
there existed, in full force and effect, a "Country Squire" 
comprehensive liablity insurance policy between Appellant and 
Respondent (R. 132, 133, 135). Pursuant to the "Farmers-
Ranchers Liability" coverage portion of said policy, it was 
provided that: 
"This policy agreement does not apply: 
2. Under Coverages Fl (Bodily Injury 
Liability), F2 (Premises Medical), G (Property 
Damage Liability), H (Employer's Liability), I 
(Medical Payments--Employee), or J (Medical 
Payments--Named Persons) to bodily injury or 
property damage arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, operation, or use, loading or 
unloading of: 
b. Any automobile owned or operated by or 
rented or loaned to any insured. But this 
subjection (b) does not apply to bodily 
injury or property damage occurring on the 
insured premises if the motor vehicle is not 
subject to motor vehicle registration, 
because it is used exclusively on the 
insured premises." 
-4-
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follows: 
Said policy further defines the term "automobile" as 
"Automobile means a land motor vehicle trailer 
. ' ' or semi-trailer, but the word automobile does not 
~nclude any crawler or farm-type tractor, farm 
implement and, if not subject to motor vehicle 
registration, any equipment, which is designed 
for use principally off public roads." 
Pursuant to the above-cited language, where it can be 
established that the vehicle involved was either a "farm 
implement" or "equipment" which is not subject to Utah's motor 
vehicle provisions and is designed to be principally used off 
public roads it will not be considered an ''automobile" and the 
policy will apply. 
Respondents join with the lower court in its decision 
that the feeder unit in question herein is not an "automobile", 
and that it is a "farm implement not subject to Utah motor 
vehicle registration and design[ed] for use principally of 
public roads" (R. 135). Respondents assert that said lower 
court decision was correct and should be upheld. Respondents 
further assert, for the reasons set forth hereinbelow, that 
Appellant has not and cannot sustain the burden of establishing 
that the lower court's decision was incorrect as a matter of 
law, and urge the Court herein to-summarily dismiss Appellant's 
appeal. 
-5-
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B. Insurance Policies are to be Construed Strictly Against the 
Issuing Company Giving Insured Broadest Protection. 
6 
Initially, in scrutinizing the lower court's decision 
and in considering the issues presented on appeal herein, it is 
vital that this court remain cognizant of the rules and 
procedures to be applied in resolving contractual 
interpretation disputes. 
It is a universally accepted rule of contract law that 
in those instances where a contract or a portion thereof, is 
found to be ambiguous or unclear, the ambiguous portion is to 
be construed most strongly against the party drafting the 
document. Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 
98, 306 P.2d 773 (1967). As noted in 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance 
§271 (1969), this rule of law is particularly applicable to 
insurance contracts and policies: 
"The general rule applicable to contracts 
generally, that a written agreement should in 
case of doubt as to the meaning thereof be 
interpreted against the party that has drawn it, 
is very frequently applied to policies of 
insurance. It constitutes an important rule of 
construction in such respect. In view of the 
fact that ordinarily and in practically all 
cases, it is the insurer who furnishes or 
prepares the policies used to embody insurance 
contracts. The general rule is that terms in an 
insurance policy which are ambiguous, equivocal, 
or uncertain to the extent that intention of the 
parties is not clear and cannot be ascertained 
clearly by the application of the ordinary rules 
of construction, are to be construed strictly and 
most strongly against the insurer and liberally 
in favor of the insured so as to effect- the 
dominant purpose of identity or payment to the 
insured." 
-6-
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The Utah Supreme Court has adopted and applied this 
principal in numerous cases involving insurance policy 
construction. Said Court, in Handley v. Mutual Life Insurance 
Co. of New York, 106 Utah 184, 191, 147 P.2d 319, 322 (1944), 
stated: 
"It is to be granted that a contract in case 
of ambiguity must be construed against the party 
who drew it and especially is that so in the case 
of contracts which are sold widely to the average 
man under sales talk which cannot be too 
technical in its expositions and yet which very 
easily lull him into a belief that he has 
purchased certain benefits which on closer 
scrutiny of the contract are asserted not to be 
included." 
See, e.g., American Casualty Co. of Redding, Pa. v. Eagle Star 
Ins. Co., Ltd., 568 P.2d 731 (Utah 1977); Christensen v. 
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Utah 2d 194, 443 P.2d 385 (1968). 
There can be no doubt that substantial ambiguity 
exists in the present insurance policy and such uncertainty 
constitutes the basis of this action and appeal. Consequently, 
the Court herein must, in its consideration of this appeal, 
apply the rule as stated in Handley, and construe all 
ambiguities in the subject policy in Respondent's favor. 
Similarly, the decision of the lower court should be viewed and 
scrutinized with recognition for the application of this most 
important rule of law. 
-7-
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C. The Subject Feeder Unit is a "Farm Implement" and not an 
"Automobile" Under the Terms of the Subject Insurance Policy. · 
In accordance with the holding in the lower court and 
as outlined hereinbelow, the subject feeder unit is a "farm 
implement" under the terms of the subject insurance policy, 
thereby constituting a specific exception to the policy's 
definition of "automobile" (R. 132, 135, 136). 
While Utah law is silent as to what constitutes a 
"farm implement", Utah Code Ann. §41-1-l(m) (1953) provides a 
definition of the term "Implement of Husbandry": 
"Implement of Husbandry." Every vehicle 
which is designed for agricultural purposes and 
exclusively used by the owner thereof in the 
conduct of his agricultural operations." 
In light of the accepted definitions of both terms, the 
vehicles encompassed under "farm implement" and "implement of 
husbandry" are suffciently similar, if not in fact identical. 
The common definition of "husbandry" is agriculture 
including both farming and livestock. See Webster's 
Dictionary. Similarly, Utah Code Ann. §59-5-58 (1953), defines 
· agricultural use in terms of ''raising of plants and animals 
useful to man including ... grains and feed crops ... livestock, 
including beef cattle, sheep, swine, horses .... " Thus, the 
meaning of "farm implement" would be similar, if not the same, 
as the meaning of "implement of husbandry". 
-8-
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It is also relevant to note the unofficial Opinion of 
I 
the Attorney General of the State of Utah dated September 12, 
1982, (R. 105-106), a copy of which is attached as Appendix "A" 
hereto. That Opinion construed the above-noted statutory 
section to mean that a vehicle originally constructed for 
non-agricultural purposes but adapted and modified for 
agricultural purposes and used exclusively for agricultural 
purposes is an "implement of husbandry" within the meaning of 
Utah Code Ann., Sections 41-1-l(m) and 41-l-19(c). 
Pursuant to the above-cited definition and Opinions, 
two requirements must be met in order for a vehicle to qualify 
as an "Implement of Husbandry". Those requirements are: 
(a) the vehicle must be designed for agricultural 
purposes; and, 
(b) the vehicle must be used exclusively by the owner 
in the conduct of his agricultural operations. 
In the instant case, as evidenced by the facts as 
outlined by Appellants and supplemented above, the feeder unit 
was and is designed solely for the purpose of delivering and 
distributing feed to livestock; a specialized agricultural 
function. The facts further show that the said unit was used 
i, exclusively for that specified and specialized function. 
The record reveals that Respondents, in an effort to 
improve the efficiency of their farm operatioris~- acquired the 
-9-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
feeder unit to assist in their manual feeding operations and 
used it to eliminate much of the hand labor associated 
therewith. Respondents further testified that: they did not use 
the feeder unit for any other purpose and that it would not be 
economical to use t~.e same to haul grain or run errands 
(Deposition of Neldon Andrews, p. 25). Respondents have and do 
operate registered trucks for those purposes (Deposition of 
Orvil Andrews, p. 23). 
Such testimony clearly establishes that the subject 
unit was designed for a specific agricultural purpose and was 
used exclusively in connection with Respondent's agricultural 
operations, as required by statute. Consequently, the subject 
feeder unit meets the Utah requirements for an "Implement of 
Husbandry", it is a "farm implement" and not an "automobile", 
and is, therefore, encompassed by Appellant's insurance policy. 
In support of this conclusion, see the case of Allred 
v. Engelman, 123 Tex. 205, 61 S.W.2d 75 (1933). Allred is a 
Texas case wherein certain tank trucks, used for hauling water 
for irrigation and gasoline to tractors in the fields were 
determined to be "implements of husbandry" within the meaning 
of a statute strikingly similar to Utah Code Ann. §41-1-19 
(1953). The Court in Allred stated: 
"The Legislature evidently had in mind that 
it was impossible to anticipate and expressly 
describe every motor vehicle whose particular 
design and use would make of it an implement of 
-10-
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:t 
:y. 
d 
do 
husbandry. It did name the ones that readily 
come t~ mind a~ implements of hu~pandry, and it 
was evidently intended by the Legislature that 
what other vehicles that might be implements of 
husb~ndry could be well left to the facts of any 
particular case, and it was obviously.for this 
reason that the general term "implements of 
husbandry" was added. It is clear that the 
purpose of the legislation was to exempt from 
reg~stration all motor vehicles primarily 
designed and used for agricultural purposes, 
temporarily using the highways." 
The rationale exhibited in Allred should be applied herein. 
Appellant, in its brief, discusses the fact that the 
feeder unit was used to transport feed on a public highway 
eleven miles per day (5-1/2 miles each way) six days a week. 
It is their assertion that the said unit thereby ceased being a 
farm implement and instead was transformed into a transport 
vehicle. Such an assertion is obviously contrary to the facts 
present before the trial court. 
There is no evidence of any kind that anything was 
transported in the feeder unit without the intention of and 
actually being fed to Respondent's lifestock. There is, 
similarly, no evidence that the subject unit was ever used for 
any contrary purpose. Additionally, there exists no threshold 
requirement relating to frequency and extent of operation on 
public roads or highways in either the term "farm implement" as 
used in the policy or "implement of husbandry" as defined in 
the above-cited statute. It is common knowledge that many farm 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
implements such as tractors, hay wagons an? combines move on 
0 
and transport equipment and commodities on public roads without 
changing their intended nature or character. 
Appellant has undoubtedly insured farmers for years 
and should certainly be expected to contemplate that farm 
implements travel from farm to farm on public roads. How else 
could farmers farming non-contiguous pieces of property move 
from field to field with their farm implements? If plaintiff 
had intended to exclude mobile farm implements, the policy 
should have been written to specifically exclude them from 
coverage. That was appellant's prerogative in drafting the 
policy and the logic of the rules of construction discussed 
above. 
The specific design of the feeder truck in question, 
with its beaters, conveyors and spouts for moving and directing 
feed, clearly make it an "implement of husbandry" or "farm 
implement" used to feed livestock. Given the plain meaning of 
the words used, the feeder unit cannot reasonably be considered 
an "automobile" as that term is defined by the subject 
insurance policy, and the lower court's decision in that regard 
must be upheld. Should there be any doubt, the principals of 
contract construction applicable to insurance policies dictate 
that the court construe any and all ambiguities in favor of 
Respondents herein and uphold the lower court's· decision. 
-12-
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Appellant, in arguing that the subject feeder unit was 
not a "farm implement," cites several cases from outside the 
state of .Utah. None of the cited cases consider statutes or 
vehicles at all similar to those in question herein and all 
cases so cited are wholly inapplicable to the issues to be 
decided herein. Most notable in this respect is the case of 
Nepstad v. Randall, 82 S.D. 615, 152 N.W. 2d 383 (1967), 
wherein the South Dakota Supreme Court held solely that "a 
motor driven goft cart while being operated on a golf course is 
not a motor vehicle within the meaning of the [South Dakota] 
guest statute." Nepstad v. Randall, Id. @ 386. The 
inapplicability of this cite to the instant case is obvious. 
The other cases cited by Appellant are of a similar nature and 
totally fail to of fer any assistance to the court in its 
resolution of the instant appeal. 
D. The Subject Feeder Unit was "Equipment" not Subject to 
Motor Vehicle Registration and Designed for use Principally off 
Public Roads. 
In addition to being properly classified as a "farm 
implement", the lower court held that the subject feeder unit 
?gard constituted "equipment" not subject to motor vehicle 
of registration and designed for use principally off public roads 
:ate ( R • 13 5 ) • 
1. Not subject to Motor Vehicle Registration. 
The applicable Utah statutes relating to the 
registration of motor vehicles is codified at Title 41 of the 
-13-
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Utah Code Annotated. That statute,· in relevant part, provides 
as follows: 
"Every motor vehicle, combination of 
vehicles, trailer, and semitrailer, when driven 
or moved upon a highway shall be subject to the 
registration and certificate of title provisions 
of this act except: 
(c) Any implement of husbandry, whether of 
a type otherwise subject to registration 
hereunder or not, which is only incidentally 
operated or moved upon a highway." 
Utah Code Ann. §41-1-19 (1953). 
As outlined above, there can be no doubt that the 
subject feeder unit was an implement of husbandry. It was 
specifically designed for agricultural purposes; the mechanical 
unloading and distribution of forage to cattle; and was 
utilized exclusively by Respondents for that purpose. As such, 
it is fundamental that the vehicle, so designed and used, is 
not subject to the applicable registration statutes. 
In the case of Allred v. Engleman, supra, @ 422, in 
holding that certain water and gasoline carrying trucks were 
not subject to state vehicle registration, the Court stated: 
"The further contention is made that these 
vehicles were not temporarily moved or operated 
upon the highways, but that they were permanently 
operated upon the highways, and being so used 
they were not subject to the exemption from 
registration. The highways were used by these 
vehicles, according to the statement of facts, 
only in passing from orchard to orchard, or from 
the source of supply of the water to the 
particular orchard where the water was discharged 
-14-
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for irrigating purposes. Such use of the 
highways was inevitable because o•f the manner in 
wh~ch the tract as a whole is cut up and 
criss-crossed by the roads. Because it so 
happens, under the facts in this case· that there 
was laid out across a portion of this' tract of 
~and, one or.more highways, which necessarily 
interfered with the operation of these trucks by 
the owner thereof, in carrying out his 
agricultural enterprises upon the land, and 
compelled him temporarily to operate his trucks 
upon these highways, would not have the effect to 
subject vehicles to registration when the same 
vehicles, if used wholly on one tract of land and 
never touching the highways, would. not be subject 
to registration. The Legislature has defined 
"temporary" use of the highways as "the operation 
or conveying between different farms." The facts 
of this case seem clearly within that definition." 
Although the Court in Allred utilized the term 
"temporarily" instead of "incidentally", as found in the 
applicable Utah Statute, the obvious intent is the same. The 
test is not whether it is necessary to go on a public road to 
get from one field to another, but rather, whether it is 
necessary to go on a public road to perform the function for 
which the farm implement is designed. 
This analysis and rationale comports with the Utah 
statutes in this area. Indeed, if that were not the case, 
paragraph c of Utah Code Ann. §41-1-19 (1953) would be entirely 
unnecessary in light of paragraph b's registration exemption 
for "any vehicle which is driven or moved upon a highway only 
for the purpose of crossing such highway from one property to 
another". Surely, if the Utah legislature had not intended 
-15-
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that farm implements be given the latitude suggested by 
Respondents, it would have so stated. 
In the present case, contrary to App~llant's 
implications, it was not necessary that the feeder unit go on a 
public road to perform its intended function. Its use thereon 
was merely incidental to its operation and necessitated only 
because of the location of certain of Respondent's animals. 
Clearly, therefore, pursuant to the applica.ble registration 
statutes, the Respondents' vehicle was not in any way subject 
to the Utah State motor vehicle registration requirements. 
It should again be noted that none of the applicable 
Utah statutes set any criteria as to distance that can be 
traveled on a public highway by an exempt vehicle. Said 
statutes merely require that the operation thereon be 
"incidental". The undisputed evidence is that for ten years 
the feeder truck was used by defendants exclusively on and 
about their 2800-acre ranch or the property adjacent thereto or 
across the road therefrom. (Deposition of Orvil Andrews, page 
25.) Any use on the public road was incidental to the cattle 
feeding purposes for which the feeder truck was designed. 
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, and in 
accordance with the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 41-1-19(c) 
(1953), Respondents assert that the lower court was correct in 
its decision that the feeder unit in question herein was not 
subject to Utah motor vehicle registration. 
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2. Designed for use principally off public roads. 
It is undisputed that, at the time of the subject 
accident, the feeder unit in question was exclusively designed 
to unload and deliver forage to cattle in a particular way with 
a minimum of hand labor and at greater speed and efficiency. 
It is similarly undisputed that Respondents, at no time, 
attempted to feed or maintain their cattle on public roads or 
highways. As such, it is obvious that the subject feeder unit 
was designed for use principally off public roads. 
Considering essentially the same issue as presented 
herein, the Texas Supreme Court in Allred v. Engleman reached 
the same result as noted above. In that case an issue was 
raised as to whether the trucks with water and gas tanks 
installed were designed primarily for agriculture use as 
opposed to use on public highways. The court considered the 
uses of the respective vehicles and concluded that the water 
trucks provided irrigation water to otherwise dry land and that 
the gas trucks provided fuel for tractors in the field without 
which the tractors would be useless. The Court, referring to 
the water and gas trucks, said, "While they might conceivably 
be put to other uses they were designed primarily and used 
exclusively for agricultural purposes." Pursuant to that 
statement, the Court went on to hold that the trucks were, as a 
result, designed for use principally off public· highway and not 
subject to highway motor vehicle registration. 
-17-
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In the present case, there can be no question but that 
the feeder unit was used exclusively for agricultural 
purposes. In accordance with the holding in Allred, the Court 
herein must uphold the lower court and find that the subject 
feeder unit was designed for use principally off public roads. 
This conclusion is similarly mandated by the language 
contained within the subject insurance policy. As noted above, 
that policy states that an excempt vehicle is one "which is 
designed for use principally off public roads." It does not 
say that the vehicle must be used primarily off public roads. 
Obviously, the policies language and intent centers around the 
purpose for which the vehicle was designed and not its 
occasional non-conforming use. 
In the instant case, the vehicle was specifically 
designed to directly feed cattle by mechanically unloading and 
depositing feed in mangers or on the ground. The above-quoted 
language does not, as written, prohibit use on the highway as 
appellant urges. If such a prohibition were intended, the word 
"designed" would have to have been omitted. Insofar as it has 
been included however, the obvious intent of the provision is 
to look to the use for which the vehicle is designed, not 
whether it is capable of, or in fact, used on a public road. 
As noted numerous times above, the subject unit was clearly 
designed for use off public roads and must be considered as 
such by the Court herein. 
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The feeder unit in question is, a~ noted above, exempt 
0 
from motor vehicle registration and is designed for feeding 
cattle; a use which is principally performed off public 
highways. As such, the subject vehicle clearly qualifies as a 
piece of "equipment" not subject to Utah highway registration 
and designed principally for off road uses. Pursuant thereto, 
it constitutes an exemption from the term "automobile" and is 
encompassed by the terms of the subject insurance policy. 
Respondents assert, therefore, that the lower court was correct 
in its decision and urge this Court to summarily dismiss 
Appellant's appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, Respondents 
assert that the subject vehicle is not an "automobile" pursuant 
to the terms of the applicable insurance policy, that the 
policy should apply and protect Respondents herein and that the 
lower court was entirely correct in it's decision in that 
regard. It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that 
Appellant has not established the required burden of showing 
reversible error as a matter of law, and consequently, the 
lower court's holding must be upheld and not reversed and 
Appellant's appeal herein must be summarily dismissed. 
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DATED this ~ day of :JLJ(7 , .,1982. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Richard C. Skeen 
Jeffrey C. Collins 
By 
h Main Street, Suite 1600 
. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-3400 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Ray H. Ivie 
By .-f~ // a Z~ fu ~~ 
48 'Nortb University Avenue~=---~­
Provo, Utah 84601 
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I 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
---------------~----------~------~--
UNOFFICIAL OPINION . 
STATUTES EXEMPTING FARM VEHICLES AND IMPLEMENTS 
OF HUSBANDRY FROM THE REQUIREMENT 
OF REGISTRATION MUST BE 
LIBERALLY CONSTRUED 
September 12. 1962 
Mr. A.O. Vlhiting 
Garland 
Utah 
Dear Sir: 
We have been asked for an opinion on the following questipn: Is a vehicle 
originally constructed for non-agricultural purposes, but adapted and modified 
for agricultural purposes and now used exclusively therefor. an "implement of 
husbandry" within the mean_ings of 41-1-1 {m) and 41-1-19 (c) of the U. C.A. 1953? 
41-1-1 (m) defines an implement of husbandry as "(e)very vehicle which is 
designed for agricultural purposes and exclusively used by the owner thereof in 
the conduct of his agricultural operations." 
41-l-19{c) allows for "(a}ny implement of husbandry, whether of a type other-
wise subject to registration hereunder or not, which is only incidentally operated 
or moved upon a highway. " 
Our conclusion is that such a vehicle would be covered by these sections 
and thus exempted from registration requirements. 
The trend today in most jurisdictions is to allow an exemption in doubtful 
cases. In Re Slade's Estate, 122 Cal. 434, 55 Pac. 158 and Allred v. Engleman, 
Inc. 1 Tex. Civ. App., 54 S. W. 2d 352. These excerpts from the last named 
case are revealing: 
"Statutes exempting farm vehicles and implements of husbandry 
from the requirment of registration must be liberally construed.'' 
" Implements of husbandry is a braod term and must include 
every machine, tool or implement used to advance farming 
interest and property." 
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Our statute presents a special problem with its requirement that a vehicle 
be designed for agricultural purposes. However, "design" does not refer ex-
clusively to the construction of the original designer but should also be construed 
to have reference to the product of any individual who 0ywrked on, remodeled 
or modified the vehicle at any time in its history. This being the case, the person 
who adapted it for its current use would be considered a designer within the 
meaning of this statute. 
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